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City of Dumaguete)S.S.
X - - - - - - -
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AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, MR .X, of legal
age, single, and a resident of Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental, after having been duly sworn to
in accordance with law,
do hereby depose and say:
1. That I am complainant in CRIM CASE NO.
2024-30220 For: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 249
IN RELATION TO ART. 6 OF THE RPC now pending before the RTC Branch 35 of Dumaguete City against MR. Y a.k.a. “Yoyo” and MR. S a.k.a.
“Juvy”;
2. That after thorough deliberation on my part, I have come
into a decision to no longer pursue the prosecution of the above–entitled case,
I now wish to live a quite private life and
continue my education and heretofore execute this affidavit of desistance so
that the above-mentioned case may be dismissed;
3. That I
execute this affidavit of desistance freely and voluntarily to attest to the
truth of the foregoing and so that the above-mentioned case may be dismissed.
4. That I
execute this affidavit of desistance freely and voluntarily to attest to the
truth of the foregoing and so
that above–described case shall be dismissed;
IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ______________________,
2024 at Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Philippines.
MR. X
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __________________ 2024 in the City of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, Philippines.
Doc. No.____;
Page No.____;
Book No.____;
Series of 2024.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This
Compromise Agreement entered by and between:
MR. X, of legal age, single and
a resident of Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental,
Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
-and-
MR. Y a.k.a. “Yoyo”, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of Banilad, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and MR. S a.k.a. “Juvy”, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties had an incident last December 26, 2023 at Banilad, Bacong.
In view of the said incident, the FIRST PARTY filed a CRIM
CASE NO. 2024-30220 For: FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 249 IN RELATION TO ART. 6 OF THE RPC now
pending before the RTC Branch 35 of Dumaguete City.
WHEREAS, after thorough
deliberation on the part of the FIRST PARTY, he has come into a decision
to no longer pursue the prosecution of the above–entitled case and wish to live
a quite private life.
WHEREAS, the parties desire to settle the
issues pertaining to said case which includes the monthly allowance;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY undertakes to withdraw the said case from the court and therefore will no longer attend the hearing/trial of the case and further the sign the Affidavit of Desistance and SECOND PARTY undertakes to give a sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000) to the FIRST PARTY for his trouble and silence regarding to the above-mentioned case;
NOW,
THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
promises and dispositions made in this agreement, the parties hereto have
agreed as follows:
1. That upon the execution of this
document, the SECOND PARTY give the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000) to the FIRST PARTY.
MR. X
FIRST PARTY
|
MR. Y SECOND PARTY |
MR. S SECOND
PARTY |
Signed in the
presence of:
1. ________________________ 2. ______________________
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF DUMAGUETE )S.S.
BEFORE ME, this ____________________, at Dumaguete City, Philippines, personally appeared the following who have satisfactorily proven their identities through their identification cards:
MR. X __________________
MR. Y __________________
MR. S __________________
to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and who acknowledged that the same are their own free act and voluntary deed.
The foregoing instrument consists of two (2) pages including this page whereon this acknowledgment is written and have been signed by the parties and their witnesses on each and every page thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND AND
SEAL, on the date and place above first written.
Doc. No.
______;
Page No. ______;
Book No.______;
Series of 2023.
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REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 29 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
"1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
"2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
"If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
"Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.1âwphi1
"Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is lestierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment."
Section 2. Article 94 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
"1. By conditional pardon;
"2. By commutation of the sentence; and
"3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence."
Section 3. Article 97 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
"1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
"2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention;
"3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention;
"4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
"5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
"An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct."
Section 4. Article 98 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
"This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence."
Section 5. Article 99 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:"
"ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked."
Section 6. Penal Clause. – Faithful compliance with the provisions of this Act is hereby mandated. As such, the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment, a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and perpetual disqualification to hold office shall be imposed against any public officer or employee who violates the provisions of this Act.
Section 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall within sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary, to implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 8. Separability Clause. – If any part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) new papers of general circulation.
Approved,
Generally, BP 22 punishes a person for issuing a worthless check.
The following essential elements must be present in order to be liable under BP 22:
(1) the person accused of violating the law makes, draws or issues any check for account or for value;
(2) he has knowledge at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check when presented for payment; and,
(3) the drawee bank dishonors the check because of insufficiency of funds, or it would have dishonored the check for the same reason if the issuer did not order the bank to stop payment for no valid reason.
A. Drawing a Check Without Sufficient Funds (Sec. 1)
A person makes or draws and issues any check
The check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value
The person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment
B. Failing to Keep Sufficient to Cover a Check Issued (Sec. 1, par. 2)
He fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within 90 days from the date appearing
The check is dishonored by the drawee bank
1. The person who issued the check.
2. An accommodation party is one who has signed the check without receiving value in exchange, and who issues the check for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
3. In case a check is issued in behalf of a corporation or other legal entity, the person who actually signed the bounced check is liable.
Any alleged violation of BP 22 pursued through the filing of a criminal complaint must be filed within four years from the dishonor of the check, before the office of the public prosecutor.
If the accused is found guilty, BP 22 provides that the penalty for its violation is imprisonment for at least 30 days but not more than one year, or a fine of at least double the amount of the check but not to exceed P200,000.
It must also be remembered that prosecution under BP 22 is not a bar for prosecution for Estafa, and the issuer of the check may be held liable for one or both crimes, singly or simultaneously when the complaints are filed in separate courts.
The essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) are:
(a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued;
(b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof.
It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be thereon, or attached thereto, the written, printed, or stamped in plane language reason for drawee’s dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no insufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written therefor or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
A notice of dishonor is not indispensable as it is not an element of the offense. However, evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is actually sought as a means to prove the second element, such that the absence of sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal in the prosecution’s case. (Jesusa T. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 163494, August 3, 2016)
The criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 must be filed within four (4) years from the time the checks have been dishonored.
Generally these are the evidence needed in the BP22 case.
1. Checks issued
2. Notice of Dishonor by the bank because of closed account or insufficiency of funds
3. Letter informing the payor to make good of the check within 5 days from the receipt of notice of insufficiency of funds or that the check is being drawn from a closed account.
4. Proof that the payor received such letter.
5. Certificate to file action if the partied are residing at the same barangay.
6. Text or chat messages about the loan.
7. Complaint affidavit of the payee and his/her witnesses.
8. Police blotter or blotter report extract.
9. Contract of loan or mortgage or others (if available).
10. Proof receipt of payment or acknowledgment receipt.
11. Promissory note (if available).
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Under Rules of Court, Rule 120 Section 6, states that:
Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
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In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
As the rule
expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be
done in absentia. The accused is
allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel
within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final.[1] The
accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the
judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration (Rule 121 ), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122). However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing
in court in order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the
date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail
himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence. Should the
trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he should be
allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the
order finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies
from the judgment of conviction.
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INSANITY - The defense
of insanity is in the nature of a confession or avoidance because an accused
invoking it admits to have committed the crime but claims that he should not be
criminally liable therefore because of insanity, which is an exempting
circumstance. An accused invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity bears
the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence because every
person is presumed sane. (People vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018)
There are two tests (People
v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950) to determine whether the
mental condition of the accused is exempting or mitigating, to wit: the test of
cognition and test of volition.
1. Test of Cognition — Under
the test of cognition, the mental condition of the accused is an exempting
circumstance of insanity if there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the criminal act (People v. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 5,
2011; People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Caguioa); or
mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there was only a partial
deprivation of intelligence. (People v. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June 29, 1981)
After satisfying his
lust, the accused threatened the victim. This implies that the accused knew
what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. It also
indicated that the crime was committed during one of his lucid intervals.
Accused is not exempt from liability for failure to pass the cognition test. (People
v. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5, 2009)
The accused's voluntary
surrender the following day when he killed the deceased belies his claim of
insanity. This act tends to establish that he was well aware of what he had
just committed. (People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Caguioa)
2. Test of Volition — Under
the test of volition, the mental condition of the accused is a mitigating
circumstance of mental illness if there is deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a
sex maniac or homicidal maniac had merely passed the volition test but not the
cognition test, he will only be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of
illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate the liability of the
offender suffering from illness. (People v. Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. 54135,
November 21, 1991) Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating circumstance of mental
illness.
In People v. Bonoan, G.R.
No. 45130, February 17, 1937, a schizophrenic accused, who acted under an
irresistible homicidal impulse to kill, was acquitted due to insanity. In sum,
the Supreme Court merely considered the test of volition in declaring the
accused exempt from criminal liability. This is not a good rule anymore.
The basis of the
exempting circumstance of insanity is lack of intelligence and not lack of
freedom. Thus, even if the mental condition of the accused had passed the
volition test (deprivation of freedom), the plea of insanity will not prosper
unless it also passed the cognition test (deprivation of intelligence). The controlling
rule is the cognition test for purposes of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. (People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004)
In several Supreme
Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are suffering from
schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to pass the cognition
test. In absence of evidence that the schizophrenic or psychotic accused was
deprived completely of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime,
it is presumed that he is sane when he committed the crime. (People v. Medina,
G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24,
1993; 1991 Bar Exam) In People v. Marzan, G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018,
schizophrenia does not fall within the stringent standard contemplated by law
as an exempting circumstance of insanity.
Time of insanity - In
order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of
insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be
manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. (People
v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Caguioa);
People vs. Mirana, G.R.
No. 219113, April 25, 2018) It is permissible to receive evidence of his mental
condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in
question. Direct testimony is not required nor are the specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. (People v. Haloc, G.R.
No. 227312, September 5, 2018)
The accused underwent
out-patient consultation for his diagnosed condition of schizophrenia from
August 2006 until 13 June 2009. However, there is no proof of his abnormal
psychological behavior immediately before or simultaneous with the commission
of the crime (on November 9, 2009). Thus, insanity is not exempting. (People
vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019)
Proof of the insanity
of the accused after the commission of the crime, especially during trial, is
immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity is continuous or
recurring. (People vs. Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021)
The mental condition of
the accused is neither an exempting circumstance nor a mitigating circumstance
if the accused was already treated for a schizophrenic condition several years
before the commission of rape. (People v. Arevalo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 150542-87,
February 3, 2004, En Banc)
IMBECILITY AND MINORITY
– Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental age is two-year old; (b)
imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose
mental age is twelve-year old and (d) borderline intelligence. (People vs.
Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011; People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No.
188978, June 13, 2012; People vs. Gilles, G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018) For
purpose of statutory rape, there is no difference between actual age and mental
age.
Having sexual
intercourse with the offended party, who is under 16 years of age, is statutory
rape under Article 266-A (d) of RPC as amended by RA No. 11648. The word “age”
in this provision includes chronological age and mental age. Hence, having
sexual intercourse with idiot, imbecile, or feebleminded is statutory rape
under Article 266-A (d) (People vs. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017;
People vs. Labordo, G.R. No. 239033, February 13, 2019; People vs. XXX, G.R.
No. 243988, August 27, 2020). Having sexual intercourse with a person with
borderline intelligence with a mental age of under 16 is also statutory rape.
The word “age” in the
phrase “person below 18 years of age” in Section 3 of RA No. 7610 is either
chronological or mental. A person who has a cognitive disability would be
considered a child under RA No. 7610 based on his or her mental age, not
chronological age. For purpose of Section 3 of RA No. 7610, there is no
difference between actual age and mental age. Thus, a mentally-retarded adult
(24 years of age), who had a mental age of an 8-year-old, is a child protected by
RA No. 7610. (Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019)
Since the concept of a
child in RA No. 7610 is adopted by RA No. 9208, a mentally-retarded adult is a
child within the context of qualified trafficking in person. (People vs.
Ybanez, G.R. No. 220461, August 24, 2016)
Under Section 5 (b) of
RA No 7610 as amended by RA No. 10648, when the child subjected to sexual abuse
is under 16 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and
acts of lasciviousness under RPC. The word “age” in the phrase “when the victim
is under sixteen (16) years of age” in Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is either
chronological or mental. For purpose of Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, there is
no difference between actual age and mental age. Hence, the victim whose actual
age is 16 years old but her mental age is 9 years old, is considered as a
victim under 16 years of age within the contemplation of Section 5 (b). (People
vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016) In exempting circumstance, there is
a difference between actual age and mental age. In exempting circumstance of
imbecility, what is important is the mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose
mental age is 2 years, and an imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old (People
vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from
criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose mental age is 12 years old, is not
exempt from criminal liability since he is not an imbecile (People vs. Nunez,
G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is entitled to mitigating
circumstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246,
November 29, 1950). In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA
No. 9344, what is important is the chronological or actual age of the accused.
If the actual age of
the accused is 18 years old and mental age is 9 years old, the exempting
circumstance of minority and imbecility shall not be appreciated because he is
neither a minor nor an imbecile (People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04,
2014).
Excerpts from 2022 CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER WITH CASES PENNED BY
J. CAQUIOA BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA.
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