SUI GENERIS (Philippine_Laws): January 2025

Psychological Incapacity

What do you mean by psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage?

In the Supreme Court Decision entitled, "Hernandez v. Court of Appeals and Hernandez," G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76, citing "Santos v. Court of Appeals," psychological incapacity was defined as follows:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Further, the Supreme Court cited "Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals," to wit:

"The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LUCKY ENRIQUEZ G.R. No. 264473 (CASE DIGEST)

Facts:

According to the prosecution, at 4:30 p.m. of May 3, 2017, the PDEA Regional Director Villanueva, conducted a briefing for the implementation of Search Warrant Nos. 5367 (2017), 5368 (2017), and 5369 (2017), all of which were issued by the executive judge of the RTC of Quezon City. Search Warrant 5368 (2017) was issued against Espando, Freddie, and Enriquez at "Informal Settler's Compound, NIA Road, Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City" to search for and seize 1. Undetermined quantity of shabu/dangerous drugs, and 2. Drug paraphernalia.

The team for the implementation of Search Warrant No. 5368 (2017) was composed of 30 PDEA agents, with Agent Sulit, as the team leader. Agent Bannagao was assigned as the arresting officer. Agent Million, as the seizing officer, was charged with searching the house described in the search warrant, which was allegedly a drug den operated by Espando, Freddie, and Enriquez. The PDEA coordinated with the Quezon City Police District and secured the attendance of the required witnesses under Section 21 of Republic Act 9165. At 5:30 p.m. that same day, the PDEA team proceeded to the target area, where the confidential informant directed them to the subject house. When they arrived at 6:00 p.m., Agent Sulit entered through the open door of the house. Some of the other PDEA agents followed him inside and went upstairs, while the others remained on the first floor. The PDEA agents looked for Espando and Freddie, but they were nowhere to be found. Enriquez, who was on the first floor, was immediately recognized. Upon seeing the PDEA agents, Enriquez ran to the second floor of the house. However, Agent Bannagao caught him and brought him back downstairs, where he was arrested and handcuffed. Agent Million presented the search warrant to Enriquez, informed him of his constitutional rights, and explained their authority to search his house. The search was witnessed by media representative Mendoza of DZAR Sonshine Radio and Barangay Kagawad Bernal of Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. Agent Million searched the first floor of the house. He found a blue pouch with the brand "Kipling" at the top drawer of a blue gray plastic cabinet beside an altar. Said pouch contained the following: 26 transparent plastic sachets containing white crystal line substance, one improvised tooter, two pieces of disposable lighters, several strips of aluminum foil, one pair of green scissors, and one empty transparent plastic sachet. Agent Million marked and inventoried the seized items, and prepared the Certificate of Orderly Search.

Issues:

First, whether Search Warrant No. 5368(2017) issued against accused appellant Enriquez was valid;

and Second, whether the PDEA properly executed Search Warrant No. 5368 (2017).

Held:

The Constitution guarantees the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures, which is sacrosanct and inviolable. Article III, Section 2 thereof provides: SECTION 2. The right or the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

It is for this reason that Article I II, Section 3 paragraph 2 of the Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. "In other words, evidence· obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. Among the requirements for a valid search warrant is that it must particularly describe the place to be searched. This requirement "is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to seize." The description in a search warrant complies with the constitutional requirement if it meets the following criteria: A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other.

Clearly, the search warrant's wording fails to meet the particularity requirement as it effectively gave the PDEA agents free reign to search every place within the Informal Settlers' Compound in NIA Road. The procedure is clear: government agents must "announce their presence, identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them." If the government agents are refused entry despite their compliance, then they have the right to break open doors or windows.

Further, government agents may execute an unannounced intrusion under limited circumstances. Regarding the conduct of the search, Rule 126, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides a hierarchy of who are prioritized as witnesses. This witness must either be the lawful occupant of the premises to be searched or any member of their family. It is only in their absence that individuals of sufficient age and discretion residing ·in the same locality may step in as witnesses. Corollarily, a search where the "witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law" and renders the search unreasonable. In this case, it is undisputed that the police agents entered accused appellant's house without permission and any announcement of their presence. The lower courts' narration of facts is consistent that upon seeing that the door to accused-appellant's house was open, the PDEA agents immediately rushed inside.

First, the government agents never sought accused-appellant's permission to enter his house giving him no opportunity to refuse. Second, as accused-appellant did not see them before they entered, he was unaware of their authority and identity. Third, there is no showing that the government agents believed there was an imminent peril to life or limb. Finally, the prosecution never claimed that. prior to their entry, the government agents were under the impression that accused-appellant was trying to escape or destroy the evidence to be seized. While accused-appellant ran away when he saw them, this act may be attributed to his shock upon waking that several strangers were suddenly inside is house, and not an indication of guilt. It is clear to this Court that the search conducted on May 3, 2017 was executed in violation of the accused-appellant's constitutional rights and the Rules of Court, rendering it void. Concomitantly, the items seized from the search are inadmissible as evidence for any purpose in any proceeding and may not be used against accused-appellant to support his conviction in the present case. Therefore, his acquittal is in order.

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