Saturday, February 22, 2025
Wednesday, January 22, 2025
Tuesday, January 21, 2025
Guzman, Bocaling Vs. Bonnevie March 2, 1992
Facts:
Africa Valdez de Reynoso, the administratrix of a parcel of land leased it to the Bonnevies for P4,000 per month with a stipulation that the Bonnevies will be given first priority to purchase the land should Reynoso decide to sell it. According to Reynoso, she notified the Bonnevies via registered mail on Nov 3, 1976 her intention to sell the property for P600K, giving them 30 days to exercise their right, which she failed to prove. The Bonnevies alleged that they didn’t receive any letter. Reynoso sold the land to Guzman, Bocaling and Co. for P400K. The Bonnevies filed an action for annulment of the sale, and that Reynoso be required to sell the property to them which CFI granted and CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract is voidable.
Held:
The CA correctly held that the Contract of Sale was not voidable but Rescissible. Under Art. 1380 to 1381 (3) of the Civil Code, a contract otherwise valid may nonetheless be subsequently rescinded by reason of injury to third persons like creditors. The status of creditors could be validly accorded the Bonnevies for they had substantial interests that were prejudiced by the sale of the subject property to the petitioner without recognizing their right of first priority under the Contract of Lease.
According to Tolentino, rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure reparation for damages caused to them by a contract, even if this should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract. It is a relief allowed for the protection of one of the contracting parties and even third persons from all injury and damage the contract may cause, or to protect some incompatible and preferent right created by the contract. Rescission implies a contract which, even if initially valid, produces a lesion or pecuniary damage to someone that justifies its invalidation for reasons of equity.
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CASES COVERED BY KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES (ARTICLE. 154);
ALARMS AND SCANDALS (ARTICLE. 155);
USING FALSE CERTIFICATES (ARTICLE. 175);
USING FICTITIOUS NAMES AND CONCEALING TRUE NAMES (ARTICLE. 178);
ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIAS (ARTICLE. 179);
PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (ARTICLE. 252);
GIVING ASSISTANCE TO CONSUMMATED SUICIDE (ARTICLE. 253);
RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN A DUEL IF ONLY PHYSICAL INJURIES ARE INFLICTED OR NO PHYSICAL INJURIES HAVE BEEN INFLICTED (ARTICLE. 260);
LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (ARTICLE. 265);
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT (ARTICLE. 266);
UNLAWFUL ARREST (ARTICLE. 269);
INDUCING A MINOR TO ABANDON HIS/HER HOME (ARTICLE. 271);
ABANDONMENT OF A PERSON IN DANGER AND ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S OWN VICTIM (ARTICLE. 275);
ABANDONING A MINOR (A CHILD UNDER SEVEN [7] YEARS OLD) (ARTICLE. 276);
ABANDONMENT OF A MINOR BY PERONS ENTRUSTED WITH HIS/HER CUSTODY; INDIFFERENCE OF PARENTS (ARTICLE. 277);
QUALIFIED TRESSPASS TO DWELLING (WITHOUT THE USE OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION). (ARTICLE. 280);
OTHER FORMS OF TRESSPASS (ARTICLE. 281);
LIGHT THREATS (ARTICLE. 283);
OTHER LIGHT THREATS (ART. 285); X GRAVE COERCION (ARTICLE. 286);
LIGHT COERCION (ARTICLE. 287);
OTHER SIMILAR COERCIONS (COMPULSORY PURCHASE OF MERCHANDISE AND PAYMENT OF WAGES BY MEANS OF TOKENS). (ARTICLE. 288);
FORMATION, MAINTENANCE AND PROHIBITION OF COMBINATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR THROUGH VIOLENCE OR THREATS (ARTICLE. 289);
DISCOVERING SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE AND CORRESPONDENCE (ARTICLE. 290);
REVEALING SECRETS WITH ABUSE OF AUTHORITY (ARTICLE. 291);
THEFT (IF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY STOLEN DOES NOT EXCEED P50.00). (ARTICLE. 309);
QUALIFIED THEFT (IF THE AMOUNT DOES NOT EXCEED P500). (ARTICLE. 310);
OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY (ARTICLE 312);
ALTERING BOUNDARIES OR LANDMARKS (ARTICLE. 313);
SWINDLING OR ESTAFA (IF THE AMOUNT DOES NOT EXCEED P200.00) (ARTICLE. 315);
OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING (ARTICLE. 316);
SWINDLING A MINOR (ARTICLE. 317);
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Sunday, January 12, 2025
Rule on Advertisements
General Rule:
No advertisements allowed.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise nor should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other self-laudation.
Exceptions or Permissible advertisements:
1. Reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data, are allowed.
2. Ordinary simple professional Card. It may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and the special branch of law practiced.
3. A simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
4. Advertisements or simple announcement of the existence of a lawyer or his law firm posted anywhere it is proper such as his place of business or residence except courtrooms and government buildings.
5. Advertisements or announcement in any legal publication, including books, journals, and legal magazines.
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Thursday, January 9, 2025
AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM (SAMPLE)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
C
I T Y O
F __________________ ) S.S.
AFFIDAVIT OF
ADVERSE CLAIM
We, _______________________________, Filipino, of legal age, married
to ________________________ and resident of _______________________, Philippines
and ________________________, Filipino, of legal age, married
to _______________________________ and resident of ___________________________, Philippines, after being sworn
to in accordance with law, do hereby state:
1. That we, together with the others hiers of ________________________, have an adverse claim on Lot No.
_____________________, with
an area of ___________________________________ (_______________) square meters, more or less, located at
Barangay _______________________
and covered by OCT
NO. _____________________. The
said parcel of land is more particularly described as:
OCT NO. _______________
“A parcel of land (Lot _____________ of the Cadastral
Survey of ___________, Cadastral Case No. _________, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. ____________).
With the improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio of ______________, Municipality
of __________________, Province of _______________________. Bounded on the NE. by the Sapang Tulac
and Lot 5111; on the S. by Lot 5112; on the SW. by Lot No. 5109; and on the NW.
by Lot No. 5109 and the Sapang tulac. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan
being S. 24 deg. 27’E., 398.94 m. from B.L.L.M No. 15; thence N. 6 deg. 48’E.,
59.47 m. to point 2; N. 37 deg. 08’W., 75.82 m. to point 3; N. 7 deg. 12’E.,
25.69 m. to point 4; N. 36 deg. 28’E., 57.27 m. to point 5; N. 85 deg. 59’E.,
33.53 m. to point 6; S. 59 deg. 03’E., 91.46 m. to point 7; S. 30 deg. 16’E.,
82.31 m. to point 8; S. 6 deg. 29’E., 57.71 m. to point 9; N. 85 deg. 36’W.,
205.79 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of ____________________________ (______________) SQAURE METERS, more or less.”
2. That late _____________________ bought the said property from ____________________, the
grandson of _____________________
last __________________________ by virtue of
the document known as “______________________________” entered as Doc No. _____, Page No. ___, Book ____ and
Series of _____________ in the notarial book of Atty. ______________________. A copy is hereto
attached and marked as Annex
“A” and made an integral part
hereof;
3.
That we inherited the said parcel
of land from the late ______________________, married to _________________________, by virtue of the document known as “________________________________” dated ______________________ entered
as Doc No. ____, Page No. ____________, Book ___ and Series of ________ in the notarial book of
Atty. ________________. A copy is hereto attached and marked as Annex “A” and
made an integral part hereof;
4. That the original copy of _______________________ is not known
to us thus we cannot process the titling of the land that we inherited.
However, it has come to my knowledge that certain __________________ (granddaughter
of __________________________) is presently claiming to still have an interest over the
aforementioned parcel of land.
5. That unless
an adverse claim is annotated on the above-mentioned ________________________, we
are in danger of being defrauded and deprived of our just and valid right over
the above-mentioned parcel of land and, as such, we are executing this
Affidavit in support of our request for the annotation of an adverse claim over
the parcel of land described herein.
IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signatures this ____________________ at
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Philippines.
|
_______________________ AFFIANT _________________ |
__________________________ AFFIANT _________________ |
SUBSCRIBED
AND SWORN to before me this ___________________, at Dumaguete City,
Philippines, affiant exhibited to me their IDs mentioned above.
Doc. No.
_____;
Page No.
_____;
Book No. _____;
Series of
2024
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ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA, respondent A.C. 6294, November 17, 2004
Facts:
Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero to finance and undertake the filing of a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original of the Owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title 4153, under the names of Spouses Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales to be transfered to him and his wife. The next day, they tried to register the title in the complainant's name at the Assessor's Office of Antipolo City. However, they were unable to do so because the property was already registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Incorporated. On May 27, 1997, respondent Zabala notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same land, executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro Sumulong in favor of the complainant and his wife. Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of the land, subject of the Deed of Sale which was notarized by respondent, with damages against the complainant and his wife. The Deed of Sale was the same document Marero used when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office and in disbarment against the complainant. To clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment against respondent. According to complainant, respondent notarized an irregular document where one of the parties to the transaction was already dead, grossly violating his oath as a notary public.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala was negligent in his conduct as a notary public.
Ruling:
Respondent did not deny that he notarized the cited Deed of Sale under the circumstances alleged by complainant. It appears that there was negligence on respondent's part which, in our view, is quite serious, A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. In doing so, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that (1) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) they are all personally known to him; (3) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (4) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
Thus, Respondent Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala GUILTY of gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public, hisNotarial commission be REVOKED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
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Tuesday, January 7, 2025
Psychological Incapacity
Psychological Incapacity
What do you mean by psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage?
In the Supreme Court Decision entitled, "Hernandez v. Court of Appeals and Hernandez," G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76, citing "Santos v. Court of Appeals," psychological incapacity was defined as follows:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Further, the Supreme Court cited "Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals," to wit:
"The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LUCKY ENRIQUEZ G.R. No. 264473 (CASE DIGEST)
Facts:
According to the prosecution, at 4:30 p.m. of May 3, 2017, the PDEA Regional Director Villanueva, conducted a briefing for the implementation of Search Warrant Nos. 5367 (2017), 5368 (2017), and 5369 (2017), all of which were issued by the executive judge of the RTC of Quezon City. Search Warrant 5368 (2017) was issued against Espando, Freddie, and Enriquez at "Informal Settler's Compound, NIA Road, Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City" to search for and seize 1. Undetermined quantity of shabu/dangerous drugs, and 2. Drug paraphernalia.
The team for the implementation of Search Warrant No. 5368 (2017) was composed of 30 PDEA agents, with Agent Sulit, as the team leader. Agent Bannagao was assigned as the arresting officer. Agent Million, as the seizing officer, was charged with searching the house described in the search warrant, which was allegedly a drug den operated by Espando, Freddie, and Enriquez. The PDEA coordinated with the Quezon City Police District and secured the attendance of the required witnesses under Section 21 of Republic Act 9165. At 5:30 p.m. that same day, the PDEA team proceeded to the target area, where the confidential informant directed them to the subject house. When they arrived at 6:00 p.m., Agent Sulit entered through the open door of the house. Some of the other PDEA agents followed him inside and went upstairs, while the others remained on the first floor. The PDEA agents looked for Espando and Freddie, but they were nowhere to be found. Enriquez, who was on the first floor, was immediately recognized. Upon seeing the PDEA agents, Enriquez ran to the second floor of the house. However, Agent Bannagao caught him and brought him back downstairs, where he was arrested and handcuffed. Agent Million presented the search warrant to Enriquez, informed him of his constitutional rights, and explained their authority to search his house. The search was witnessed by media representative Mendoza of DZAR Sonshine Radio and Barangay Kagawad Bernal of Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. Agent Million searched the first floor of the house. He found a blue pouch with the brand "Kipling" at the top drawer of a blue gray plastic cabinet beside an altar. Said pouch contained the following: 26 transparent plastic sachets containing white crystal line substance, one improvised tooter, two pieces of disposable lighters, several strips of aluminum foil, one pair of green scissors, and one empty transparent plastic sachet. Agent Million marked and inventoried the seized items, and prepared the Certificate of Orderly Search.
Issues:
First, whether Search Warrant No. 5368(2017) issued against accused appellant Enriquez was valid;
and Second, whether the PDEA properly executed Search Warrant No. 5368 (2017).
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures, which is sacrosanct and inviolable. Article III, Section 2 thereof provides: SECTION 2. The right or the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
It is for this reason that Article I II, Section 3 paragraph 2 of the Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. "In other words, evidence· obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. Among the requirements for a valid search warrant is that it must particularly describe the place to be searched. This requirement "is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to seize." The description in a search warrant complies with the constitutional requirement if it meets the following criteria: A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other.
Clearly, the search warrant's wording fails to meet the particularity requirement as it effectively gave the PDEA agents free reign to search every place within the Informal Settlers' Compound in NIA Road. The procedure is clear: government agents must "announce their presence, identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them." If the government agents are refused entry despite their compliance, then they have the right to break open doors or windows.
Further, government agents may execute an unannounced intrusion under limited circumstances. Regarding the conduct of the search, Rule 126, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides a hierarchy of who are prioritized as witnesses. This witness must either be the lawful occupant of the premises to be searched or any member of their family. It is only in their absence that individuals of sufficient age and discretion residing ·in the same locality may step in as witnesses. Corollarily, a search where the "witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law" and renders the search unreasonable. In this case, it is undisputed that the police agents entered accused appellant's house without permission and any announcement of their presence. The lower courts' narration of facts is consistent that upon seeing that the door to accused-appellant's house was open, the PDEA agents immediately rushed inside.
First, the government agents never sought accused-appellant's permission to enter his house giving him no opportunity to refuse. Second, as accused-appellant did not see them before they entered, he was unaware of their authority and identity. Third, there is no showing that the government agents believed there was an imminent peril to life or limb. Finally, the prosecution never claimed that. prior to their entry, the government agents were under the impression that accused-appellant was trying to escape or destroy the evidence to be seized. While accused-appellant ran away when he saw them, this act may be attributed to his shock upon waking that several strangers were suddenly inside is house, and not an indication of guilt. It is clear to this Court that the search conducted on May 3, 2017 was executed in violation of the accused-appellant's constitutional rights and the Rules of Court, rendering it void. Concomitantly, the items seized from the search are inadmissible as evidence for any purpose in any proceeding and may not be used against accused-appellant to support his conviction in the present case. Therefore, his acquittal is in order.
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1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION- AUDIO CODAL
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